Ten days after our capture the Chief Engineer - Fred - and I hatched a plan. I tried to get a coded message to the Americans via Copenhagen. At midnight on the 11th we blacked out the ship and blockaded ourselves into the ballast tank. We listened for the attack, but all we could hear was the Somalis trying to get at us. At five in the afternoon we tried to give ourselves up but they had bolted us in.
We thumped on the door and they let us out at seven. After this we lost all our privileges and they followed us everywhere. Sometimes, as time dragged on, the younger pirates suggested killing the Russians and sinking the boat. They thought Fred and I were more valuable. Every day we talked about the ransom. Initially they asked for $2.5 million but Fred convinced them the company would never give that much. During the negotiations one time the new interpreter (Geli), a schoolteacher, said: `Look, here this is your last chance - give us the money in three days or the crew will be shot, you can put that in your pipe and smoke it.' The negotiations were handled by Control Risks who have experience at that. They later tried $900,000 but eventually settled for $678,000. The money was assembled as cash in Dubai where they hoped a Somali businessman would handle the delivery for them, but no one would. In the end the money came on a boat. It came alongside with the crew hidden. Our pirates went over and moved the money across. Now the pirates had the boat, the crew and the money! All night the pirates divided the money between themselves. Most left in the morning but Omar and the schoolteacher said it wasn't safe for them to go ashore here, so we dropped them further north. Next day we met up with the warship. I asked why they didn't attack; one guy said they hadn't received the message; another said: `Even if we had received it we'd need an order from higher up to do anything.' We were held for 47 days. We went from Oman to Dubai, where we met our wives. I said it was the trip to end all trips but I've been on a few since then.
Source: Interview with the author, 15 September 2008
2. Why it matters to the international community
There are deeper reasons why the international community needs to take heed of this problem than simple law enforcement. They can be divided into four areas:
what piracy does to Somalia;
what it does to international trade, especially oil;
the danger to the environment;
the potential terrorist threat.
2.1 What piracy does to Somalia
The danger of Somali waters in late 2007 forced the WFP to suspend food deliveries by sea (delivery by land is just as risky and is impractical for transporting large quantities of food aid). According to the WFP, Somalia will require at least 185,000 tonnes of food aid in 2008. This was temporarily solved by the naval escorts for WFP vessels mentioned above. The WFP was forced to stop for two months when the Netherlands completed its stint until Canada announced that the HMCS Ville de Quйbec would escort WFP deliveries. Without the naval escorts and the regular delivery of food aid, Somalia's food stocks were seriously threatened. In a country without a functioning central government that is suffering from drought and war, and with over a million internally displaced people,8 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement - Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2007, April 2008. http://www.internal-displacement.org/. imported food aid is essential. The uncertainty surrounding escorts for WFP ships needs to end and escorts should be pledged in advance so that dangerous gaps in food delivery can be avoided. If the international community does only one thing, then ensuring the safe delivery of food aid should be the priority. Somalia is one of the most dangerous and violent places in the world. Arms are freely available throughout the country and there are almost daily reports of explosions, murders, skirmishes, battles and kidnappings across the country. While pirates themselves keep the majority of the funds they generate, a significant amount is passed on to important locals, some of whom are involved in the ongoing war. These regular injections of cash undoubtedly help to finance the war. Some reports31 link piracy money to the US terror-listed Al Shabaab, which emerged as a youth militia during the rule of the Islamic Courts and is now fighting an insurgency against Ethiopian and government troops. Eradicating piracy will not stop the war, but it may reduce the money available for arms purchases.
The lack of maritime security also allows a busy people- and arms-smuggling trade to flourish and encourages illegal fishing in Somali waters. Greater efforts by the international community to combat piracy should have a positive impact in these areas as well.
2.2 What piracy does to international trade
Clearly a company whose cargo is prevented from reaching its destination on time will lose money. Add to this the cost of paying ransoms and already the damaging economic effect of Somali piracy can be seen. The consequences are not limited only to companies whose vessels are hijacked; of wider concern is the growth of insurance premiums for ships that need to pass through the Gulf of Aden. The danger means that war risk insurance premiums must now be paid: premiums are reported to have risen tenfold in a year. Miles Costello, `Shipping insurance costs soar with piracy surge off Somalia', The Times, 11 September 2008.
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4727372.ece.
If the cost of extra insurance becomes prohibitive, or the danger simply too great, shipping companies may avoid the Gulf of Aden and take the long route to Europe and North America around the Cape of Good Hope. Indeed this option is mentioned by shipping industry insiders as a very real possibility. The extra weeks of travel and fuel consumption would add considerably to the cost of transporting goods. At a time when the price of oil is a major concern, anything that could contribute to a further rise in prices must be considered very serious indeed.
2.3 Potential environmental catastrophe
Large oil tankers pass through the Gulf of Aden and the danger exists that a pirate attack could cause amajor oil spill in what is a very sensitive and important ecosystem. During the attack on the Takayama the ship's fuel tanks were penetrated and oil spilled into the sea. The consequences of amore sustained attack could be much worse. As pirates become bolder and use ever more powerful weaponry a tanker could be set on fire, sunk or forced ashore, any of which could result in an environmental catastrophe that would devastate marine and bird life for years to come. The pirates' aim is to extort ransom payments and to date that has been their main focus; however, the possibility that they could destroy shipping is very real.
2.4 Possible co-opting by international terrorist networks
The other worst-case scenario is that pirates become agents of international terrorism. It should be emphasized that to date there is no firm evidence of this happening. However, in a region that saw the attacks on the USS Cole, seaborne terrorism needs to be taken very seriously. For example, a large ship sunk in the approach to the Suez Canal would have a devastating impact on international trade. Terrorism at sea could take many forms: direct attacks on naval or commercial shipping, such as the 6 October 2002 attack on the MV Limburg, `Yemen ship attack “was terrorism”', BBC,13 October 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2324431.stm.hostages from pleasure boats being used as bargaining chips for terrorists or high-profile victims of an atrocity, and hijacked ships being used as floating weapons. Terrorist networks could also use the financial returns of piracy to fund their activities around the world.
The potentially massive consequences of this scenario must be taken into account along with the more likely scenario that piracy money is being routed to Al Shabaab. As has been seen over the last year, pirates in Somalia have become ever more dangerous, but it is impossible to tell what will happen next. It is best to act to prevent the worst-case scenarios rather than try to solve the problem once it has escalated.
Box 2: Private security and Somali piracy
Private security firms have a long history of involvement in attempting to combat Somali piracy. To date, however, none have been very effective and in the majority of cases it is hard to see that anything at all was achieved.
Secopex
This French private security firm signed an agreement in May 2008 with TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf to provide maritime security for Somalia and a bodyguard for the president. The TFG insists that the deal will be paid for by the international community, but so far the $50-200 million needed has not been forthcoming.
Topcat
In November 2005 the TFG signed a $50 million or $55 million contract with the US security firm Topcat to target `mother ships' being used by Somali pirates. The chief executive of Topcat told the BBC, 'We will end the piracy very quickly; there is no question about that' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4471536.stm). Topcat's deployment was blocked by the US State Department, which judged that it would breach the arms embargo on Somalia.
Al-Habiibi Marine Service
This Saudi-based company was appointed by the government of Puntland in December 2005. However its employees were unable to take up their positions in Somalia.
SOMCAN - Somali Canadian Coastguard
SOMCAN held a contract from the government of Puntland from 2002 to 2005 to provide coastguard facilities for Puntland. Its effectiveness was called into question as three of the company's employees were sentenced to ten years in jail in Thailand for piracy, although they claimed to have been protecting a Thai fishing boat.
Puntland International Development Corporation PIDC was contracted in 2000 by the government of Puntland to combat piracy. It subcontracted the work to Hart Security.
HART Security Hart undertook to provide training for a 70-man maritime force in Puntland from November 1999. A vessel was secured and arms were procured through local arms markets. Hart staff took up residence in Somalia. The scheme was supposed to be funded through the collection of fishing dues. Hart wrapped up its operations in June 2002 when it became unclear if a new administration in Puntland had the authority to honour their contract.
Страницы: 1, 2, 3, 4
